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Black Balance of Power in a Metropolitan
Southern County: Fact or Fancy?
H. RosE
East Texas State University
WINFIELD

In a recent study Joe R. Feagin and Harlan Hahn suggest a list
of conditions that minority groups must fulfill to maximize their political strength. 1 Among these are " ... the acquisition of political experience, the development of seasoned political leaders, the protection of
legal safeguards , and a willingness to engage in a gradual rather than
swift capture of political influence .... " 2 In the same vein, Feagin and
Hahn also suggest that the rules of a democratic political system predicate that there be: " ( 1) a large number of minority voters; ( 2) high
voter registration and turnout ; ( 3) nearly maximal cohesion or unanimity in the choice of candidates; and ( 4) a divided vote among majority
electors." 3 Moreover, in an electorate where a minority comprises a
sizable proportion of the total but lacks, by definition, a majority, it is
clear that its chances of electoral success on questions that seriously
divide the electorate are greatest when it effectively exercises a balance
of power at the polls.
This study will examine the electoral behavior of Durham County,
orth Carolina during the decade of the 1960's in the light of the criteria posited by Feagin and Hahn and will observe: ( 1) what trends,
if any, developed during that time; and (2) when and under what conditions the black electorate successfully exercised a balance of power
and thereby achieved the electoral results it desired. In so doing, the
study will examine all elections for national office 1960-1970 inclusive,
three gubernatorial elections , and ten county referenda. It will also
examine County Commissioner balloting in 1968 and 1970 and the
Durham city mayoral elections of 1971, elections in which black candidates were on the ballot.
1 Joe R. Feagin and Harlan Hahn, "The Second Reconstruction: Black Political
Strength in the South." Social Science Quarterly, LI (June, 1970), pp. 42-56.
2 Ibid., p. 42.
3 Ibid.
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THE DURHAM COUNTY SETTING
Durham County is located in the piedmont region of North Car olina at the northeast end of an area known as the "piedmont crescent."•
The county arose after the Civil War as the site of new industria l enterprises , those being tobacco and textiles. 6 In addition to these and
other industries , the county also is the site of Duke University and North
Carolina Central University. The latter is state-supported and is a pr edominantly black institution. The black proportion of the county's p opulation always has been considerable. In 1890 blacks comprised 33.8%
of the total, in 1920 35%,° in 1960 32%,7 and in 1970 32.6%.8
"Black capitalism" today is a fashionable phrase and is thought to
be, at least in some quarters , relatively novel. In Durham, however, it
has been practiced for decades, particularly in the fields of insuran ce
and banking. In 1898 the North Carolina Mutual and Provident Association was founded, evolving in 1919 into the North Carolina Mutual
Life Insurance Company. 9 In the intervening years the company prospered and today it is generally considered the largest black-owne d business in the United States. 10 Other black businesses include the Mechan ics and Farmers Bank and the Mutual Savings and Loan Association.
The development and success of these black-owned business ent erprises have had a distinct impact on Durham County as a whole as well
as on its black citizens. Very importantly, .financially independent and
secure middle and upper class blacks have emerged, along with the
faculty of North Carolina Central University, to provide articulate and
effective leadership for the black community.
In their study of four southern communities, Matthews and Prothro
analyzed black leadership in terms of two objectives: first, their ability
to instill morale in and to gain wide consent from their followers and ,
second, their effectiveness in attaining group goals. Such leaders in
their "Piedmont'' county, that is, Durham County, ranked highest on
both measures . Perhaps this is because, as Matthews and Prothr o state,
* Preston W. Edsall and J. Oliver Williams, "North Carolina: Bipartisan Paradox," Ch. 8 in William C. Havard, ed., The Changing Politics of the South. Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972, pp. 366-423, esp. p. 400.
6 William Kenneth Boyd, The Story of Durham: City of the New South. Durham: Duke University Press, 1927.
a Boyd, p. 283.
7 U. S. Bureau of the Census. U. S. Censuses of Population and Housing: 1960.
Census Tracts. Final Report PHC ( 1 )-42 , 1961. Based on statistics contained in
Table P-1, p. 14.
8 U. S. Bureau of the Census. U. S. Censuses of Population and Housing: 1970.
Census Tracts. Final Report PHC ( 1 )-61, 1972. Based on statistics contained in
Table P-1, p. 1.
0 Boyd, pp. 286-88.
10 William R. Keech, The Impact of Negro Voting: The Role of the Vote in
the Quest for Equality . Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1968, p. 15.
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"their feelings about the past and present of race relations are more
nearly those of the Negro common man than is true in any other county"
even though they are "by far the most socially and economically privileged" of the four groups of black leaders studied. 11
This effective and articulate black leadership emerged in political
form as the Durham Committee for Negro Affairs, founded in 1935.12
More will be said about this organization later, but at this point several
comments are in order. First, the Committee provides clear-cut voting
cues to black voters on candidates and referenda through endorsements.
Second, it accordingly provides and distributes sample ballots to black
voters as they arrive at the polling places on election day. Third, it
stresses the importance of bloc voting and over the years has elevated
this tactic to the status of a tradition. Fourth, the consequence has been
a highly cohesive black vote in accordance with its stand. Keech found
that in the period 1949---1967 the vote in the black precincts averaged
91% in favor of the DCNA endorsee. 1 3 Fifth, the Committee also stresses
registration and turnout but, as will subsequently be shown, its success
in these efforts has not been as great as in achieving a high degree of
cohesion among those blacks who do register and turn out to vote.
Finally, with black voters comprising 27% of the Durham County electorate, as they did in 1970, it is obvious they are a most important force
to be reckoned with when running for office or promoting a referendum
proposition.
Often working hand-in-hand with the DCNA is The Carolina Times,
a black weekly newspaper founded in 1919. In 1965 the newspaper had
an average circulation of 23,716 copies.H The 1960 and 1970 censuses
respectively reported the presence of 9,105 and 11,799 occupied black
housing units in Durham County; 16 thus, it is quite plausible that the
Times is regularly present in almost every black home in the county.
In sum, Durham County blacks meet the general conditions posited
by Feagin and Hahn. The Durham Committee for Negro Affairs, now
in existence for 40 years, cons,titutes a seasoned and experienced political vanguard for the black community. More importantly, its leadership
is accepted, as Matthews and Prothro have affirmed, and it has a widelydistributed community mouthpiece in the form of The Carolina Times .
11 Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, Negroes and the New Southern
Politics. New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, 1966, pp. 197-99. Matthews and
Prothro's "Urbania" and "Piedmont County" are, without doubt, Durham and Durham County respectively. This conclusion is shared by Keech, p. 18.
12 Keech, p. 26. In 1972 the name was changed to the Durham Committee on
the Affairs of Blacks.
18 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
u William F. McCallister, ed., Ayer Directory of Newspapers and Periodicals,
1965. Philadelphia: N. W. Ayer and Son, Inc., p. 796.
16
Final Reports PHC (1)-42 (1960) and PHC (1)-61 (1970), Tables H-3.
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Being financially independent, this leadership is not dependent on white
toleration or patronage and is not, therefore, subject to the threa t of
white economic sanctions; indeed, the clienteles of the black businesses
outlined above are almost entirely black. In sum, the analysis tha t follows essentially is an examination of the electoral effectiveness of the
DCNA in the 1960's.
Another contributing factor is the protection of legal safegua rds .
As the late V. 0. Key pointed out in his classic study, North Carolina
is different 16 and Durham County is part of that tradition. It has b een
years since systematic and widespread efforts were made to stifle black
participation in the political processes of Durham County.17 Moreover,
Durham County was not one 28 North Carolina counties that came under the jurisdiction of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. 18
Finally, blacks have indeed been willing "to engage in a gradual
rather than swift capture of political influence." The Durham Committee for Negro Affairs had been in existence for 10 years when, in 1945,
the first black ran for the Durham city council . The first successful such
candidacy did not occur until 1953. Beginning in 1963, blacks trie d to
add a second seat on the council and succeeded in 1967, making two
blacks on a council of 13.19 They did not run a candidate for the Board
of County Commissioners until 1968 or for Mayor of Durham until 1971.
POPULATION AND REGISTRATION CHANGES 1960-197 0
Durham County's 1960 population of 111,995 increased to 132,681
in 1970 for a gain of 18.5%.20 The black population rose from 35,862 to
43,239 for a gain of 20.6% but the black proportion of the total popu lation rose a negligible 0.6% from 32.0% to 32.6%. At the same time the
growth rate of the white population was somewhat less, rising from
75,965 to 88,979 for a gain of 17.1%.
In keeping with these trends ( or the lack thereof), the white and
black proportions of the county electorate did not change significantly
between 1960 and 1970. As Table 1 shows, the white proportion of th e
16 Southern Politics in State and Nation . New York: Vintage Books, 1949, pp .
205-10.
11 Keech, p. 26. As a matter of fact, in 1970 a black was elected Chairman of
the Durham County Board of Elections. For a study in stark contrast, see the examination of Forrest County, Mississippi by James W. Silver in Mississippi: The
Closed Society, 2nd edition. New York: Harcourt , Brace, and World, 1966, pp .
105-06.
1s CongTessional Quarterly Weekly Report, vol. XXIII, no. 12, March 19, 1965,
p. 431.
10 Keech, p. 47.
20 These and subsequent population statistics are either taken from or are ba sed
on data in the respective census reports already cited, Tables P-1.

:BLACK BALANCE OF POWER IN A METROPOLITAN

TABLE I.

125

Registration 1960-1970

Change 1960-1970

1970

1960

White
Black
Total

SOUTHERN COUNTY

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

89843
12439
52282

76.2%
23.8%

39280
14568
53848

72.8%
27.0%

- 563
+2129
+1566

- 1.4%
+17.1%
+ 3.0%

electorate declined from 76.2% to 72.8% while the black rose from 23.8%
to 27.0%. In the same vein, Table 1 also shows that total registration rose
by 1,566 or 3.0%, that white registration declined by 563 or 1.4%, and
that black registration rose by 2,129 for a gain of 17.1%.21
Interpreted, however, in terms of the percentage of voting age persons registered, both whites and blacks lost ground between 1960 and
1970.2 2 The increase in black registration did not keep pace with the
increase in black VA.P's and the proportion consequently declined from
63.4% to 62.7%, as indicated in Table 2. The white percentage of VAP's
registered, however, dropped even more markedly, from 84.2% to
73.8%.29
Table 2 also shows that the percentage of white VA.P's registered
exceeded that of blacks in both 1960 and 1970 but that the margin by
which the white percentage eXcceededthe black decreased during the
decade, declining from 20.8 to 11.1 percentage points. Thus, even
21 In 1970 Durham County computerized its registration system and it became
possible to group voters by race and precinct. For years the County has had six
clearly identifiable black precincts which, in 1970, were, in sum, 96% black and
which contained 18% of the total county electorate. Since the total electorate was
27% black that same year, the black precincts should have contained approximately
two-thirds of the total black electorate. Using the 1970 data, the sum of the black
registrations for the six precincts is 9,672. Multiplying this by 1.5 yields 14,508 for
the county-wide total. The computer listed 14,568 registered blacks, indicating the
extrapolation was in error by only 60 persons or 0.4%. Prior to 1970, breaking the
electoral data down by race was impossible. The 1960 data used in this study were,
therefore, obtained by using the process just outlined. Using data published in the
May 28, 1960 edition of the Durham Morning Herald, p. 6-A, the total registration
for the same six black precincts was 8,293. Multiplying this by 1.5 yields 12,439 for
t):iecounty-wide black total. At the same time, total registration was listed as 52,282.
Subtracting 12,439 then gives 39,843 for the white total.
I am grateful to Mrs. Anna Meyer, clerk of the Durham County Board of
Elections, for making the 1970 registration data and much of the electoral data used
in this study available to me.
22 The numbers of white and black voting age persons ( 21+) in 1960 and 1970
were computed from data given in the respective census reports cited above, Table
P-2, p. 17 for 1960 and Table P-5, p. 25 for 1970.
23 I am aware that 1960 registration data for the county are presented in U. S.
Commission on Civil Rights, Report, vol. I, Voting, Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1961, pp. 278-79. I was, however, unable to establish the
source of these data and felt compelled not to use them in this study because of
questionable validity. For example, the report indicated that 98.1% of voting age
whites were registered. Other statistics seemed somewhat more accurate but I chose
to rely on my own computations throughout.
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Voting Age Persons Registered 1960-1970
1970

1960
Number
Number
Registered
VAP

Entire County
Whites
Blacks
Margin of White
over Black

66930
47296
19634

52282
39843
12439

Percent

78.1%
84.2%
63.4%
20.8%

Number
Number
Registered
VAP

76328
53104
23224

53,848
39,208
14,568

Percent

70.5%
73.8%
62.7%
11.1%

though the white majority remains sizable in terms of both the total
county population and the county electorate, blacks did gain ground in
their potential electoral sb·ength over the decade from 1960 to 1970,
but this gain resulted not from an increased rate of registration on their
part but from a decreased rate of registration on the part of whites . It
is true, then, that Durham County blacks, in spite of the efforts of the
Durham Committee for Negro Affairs, are sacrificing a portion of their
electoral potential simply by not registering at rates comparable to those
of whites.
TURNOUT AND VOTI G 1960-1970
Six of Durham County's 38 voting precincts are predomina ntly
black. 24 Combined, they were 96% black and 4% white in 1970. The
following analys,is represents a comparison of turnout rates in the six
black precincts and in the remaining 32 white precincts. 26 In all cases
the total registration base was the current figure for that time, varying
from election to election.
Let us first examine turnout in general elections. In North Carolina
gubernatorial elections coincide with Presidential elections and Table 3
shows that in those three instances the turnout of the two groups was
virtually equal. In the three remaining "off-year" elections, however, the
white and black turnout rates were virtually equal only in 1962 with
whites exceeding blacks by a fairly sizable margin in 1966 and 1970.
The five County Commissioners are elected at-large in the November general elections also. In 1968 two blacks were on the b allot and
in 1970 one. Their presence does not seem to have motivated blacks t.o
tum out in greater numbers to support them. Indeed, black turnout
24 They are f.recincts No. IO-Whitted
School, No. 11-Hillside School, No. 12
-Pearson Schoo, No. 13--Burton School, No. 17-Fuller School, and No. 34Pearsontown School No. 2.
26 The registration data for the 32 white precincts revealed them to be, in sum,
88% white and 12% black. I am aware that the presence of black voters in these
precincts dilutes the purity of these data as indicators of white turnout but since
only relative comparisons need be made here these voters are not factored out. At
the subsequent stage of the analysis dealing with balance of power, greater preciseness is called for and a correction factor will be introduced.
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TABLE 3. Turnout in General Elections 1960-1970
White
1960 .... · · · · · · · · · ·
1962 ...........
. ...
1964 ................

64.9%
41.3%
80.7%

White

Black

62.0% 1966 ... . ............
50.5%
41.9% 1968
..............
83.2%
80.4% 1970 ... ·. . . . . . . . . . . . . 43.3%

Bl,ack
40.0%
83.7%
36.2%

actually was less in 1970 than in 1966 or 1962 when no black candidates
were running. And, since white and black turnout rates were virtually
equal in 1960 and 1964 as well as in 1968, it would seem that national
and state balloting are the primary attraction rather than the presence
of black candidates for local office.
In the same vein, a black was running for mayor of Durham in the
municipal elections of 1971. In the primary, white turnout was 21.2%
while the black was 23.7%. The general election amounted to a runoff
between the black candidate and a white opponent. White turnout in
this instance was 40.8% while blacks turned out at the rate of 41.3%. In
these two municipal elections, then, the black turnout rate exceeded the
white but onJy by a small fraction. In sum, the presence of black candidates on the ballot does not seem to induce blacks to tum out to vote
at rates higher than those of whites. They behave similarly to voters
across the country in that P,residential and gubernatorial elections have
the greatest attraction for them. As long as this pattern prevails, then,
it would seem that blacks are sacrificing potential political strength in
at least two ways: (1) being a pre-determined minority, they need to
turn out at rates significantly higher than those of whites, and ( 2) the
failure of blacks to tum out in greater proportions when black candidates are running may constitute a rather effective discouragement to
prospective black candidates in the future.
Let us now tum to turnout in the ten county referenda of the
decade by examining Tables 4 and 5. Three of the referenda, the 1966
hospital bonds and the hospital and airport bonds of 1968, coincided
TABLE 4.

Turnout in County Referenda

1960-1970

White

1960 school bonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1961 metro charter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1964 school bonds O ..•••••.•••.
• •.••.••.••.
• .•..•.••.•••
1966 hospital bonds " ...........................
. ........
1968 school bonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1968 library bonds and permissive levy ............
. ..... . .. .
1968 hosttal and airport bonds O • • • • • • • • • • • . • • . • . • • . • • • • • •
1969 1% ocal option sales tax ..........
.. .. . ... .. ... .... ..

22.8%
84.3%
66.7%
50.5%
28.9%
24.1%
83.2%
28.4%

Bl,ack
26.7%
16.8%
65.4%
40.0%
17.0%
12.2%
83.7%
15.9%

When the ·referendum coincided with a general election or with a primary, total
reported turnout was used ( " ) . In other instances turnout was computed by adding
the positive and negative votes.
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Voting Rates in Referenda that are Concurrent with General or Primary

Black

White

'

~-5°

Jt

13>

~
<I)

;:

t: ·"

~o

E-<,3i!:

-1
C

~
~

"t:°tl ~
<I)~
~

...
<I)

ti""'g~

Q.,

May 1964
School Bonds
November 1966
Hospital Bonds
November 1968
Hospital Bonds
November 1968
Airport Bonds

"

...

i:c;

-~~
<I) ....

~

...-5

I:

~

~l

§

~e
~>

E-<
~

~
<I)

I:

's§~

~?

....'IS;:

..i:..i,:;

~

ti::) ..

0

~~
\,_~~

t

5.i::

0

i:c;

.e~
..,. C

~E
i:..i~
0

0

56.8%

37.9%

31.6%

20.7%

85.3%

43.0%

68.0%

27.2%

74.3%

61.8%

55.7%

46.6%

71.4%

59.4%

49.2%

41.2%

° Computed

by dividing the sum of positive and negative votes by total reported
turnout.
°" Computed by dividing the sum of positive and negative votes by the total registration figure for that time.

with a November general election and a fourth, the 1964 school bonds,
coincided with the May Democratic gubernatorial primary, a primary
that culminated a particularly vigorous campaign. 26 Since the H:}68hospital and airport referenda were concurrent , three rather than four sets
of turnout are at issue here and Table 4 shows that in two instances
( 1964 and 1968) white and black turnout were virtu ally equal while
in the third ( 1966) white exceeded black by 10.5 percentage points.
However, these observations are misleading because not all voters who
voted in the general elections or in the primary voted in the referenda
held along with them. Table 5 shows this to be true in both the white
and black precincts but much more so in the black. For these four
referenda the average white effective turnout was 50.5% while the black
was 33.9%. Thus, there are voters in both groups who vote in the general election but do not vote in the referendum held at the same time.
This problem is worse among blacks than whites and thereby weakens
the voice of blacks in such referenda .
Of the six remaining referenda , those which did not coincide with
a general or primary election, five sets of turnout are at issue because
the library bonds and permissive levy referenda of 1968 were concur26

See Edsall and Williams , pp. 387-89.

:BLACK BALANCE OF POWER

IN A METROPOLITAN

SOUTHERN

COUNTY

129

rent. These referenda occurred at "odd" times like January or March 21
and Table 4 shows that in four of the five cases the black turnout rate
was roughly half that of whites while in the remaining instance ( 1960
school bonds) black turnout exceeded white by 3.9 percentage points.
Put another way, for these five sets of turnout the white average is
27.7% while the black is 17.7%.
It is obvious, then , that general and primary elections have a
"pulling" effect in that voting participation in referenda that coincide
with them exceeds that in referenda which occur as special elections.
For both the white and black precincts the ratio of the former to the
latter is approximately two to one. It also is obvious that in both types
of referenda the white turnout rate exceeds the black by a significant
margin. In sum, we see again that Durham County blacks have sacrificed electoral potential, in these instances simply by not voting at rates
comparable to those of whites.
Let us now turn to referendum voting in the decade from 1960 to
1970 by examining Table 6. We already have observed that the registration statistics of the six predominantly black precincts revealed them
to be 96% black and 4% white in 1970 and that blacks comprised 27%
of the total county electorate that same year. The six black precincts ,
however, contained only 18% of the total county electorate and we may
oonclude, then , that they contain approximately two-third's of the total
TABLE 6. Effect of Black Vote on Referendum Outcome

Referendum
1960 school bonds
1961 metro charter
1964 school bonds
1966 hospital bonds
1968 school bonds
1968 library bonds
1968 library levy
1968 hospital bonds
1968 airport bonds
1969 sales tax

Countywide
vote
67.3%+
32.7%22.2%+
77.8%51.5%+
48.5%37.0%+
63.0%44.6%+
55.4%43.1%+
56.9%39.2%+
60.8%64.4%+
35.6%47.1%+
52.9%60.3%+
39.7%-

Vote in the
Vote in the
Black precincts White precincts
18.1%+
81.9%13.9%+
86.1%23.3%+
76.8%12.5%+
87.5%19.8%+
80.2%74.1%+
25.9%68.7%+
31.3%87.3%+
12.7%79.8%+
20.2%31.4%+
68.6%-

78.2%+
21.8%23.2%+
76.8%55.6%+
44.4%41.2%+
58.8%47.4%+
52.6%39.1%+
60.9%35.3%+
64.7%60.7%+
39.3%42.3%+
57.7%63.7%+
36.3%-

Revised
white vote
86.3%+
13.7%24.4%+
75.6%60.4%+
39.6%45.1%+
54.9%51.2%+
48.8%34.3%+
65.7%30.8%+
69.2%57.1%+
42.9%37.1%+
62.9%68.2%+
31.8%-

27
.
The 1% local o_ption sales tax referendum occurred in November of 1969 but
smoe 1969 was an odd year no other elections were held at that time.
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black electorate. This is reflect ed in the fact that the registration data
of the 32 white precincts reveal them to be 88% white and 12% black.
Testing of the effectiveness of the black electorate in terms of possible balance of power , consequently , will be based on the assump tion
that blacks in the white precincts voted in the same proportions for and
against the propositions ,as did those in the six black precincts. For each
referendum , then , Table 6 contains four sets of data. The first is the
total county-wide vote. The second is the vote of the six black precin cts.
The third is the vote of the 32 white precincts not corrected for the
possible 12% black vote in them. Finally, the fourth is the re-calcul ated
vote of the white precincts with the black vote in them removed according to the assumption outlined above. 28
From Table 6 several observations can be made. First, we may
observe that , county-wide, four referenda resulted in approval of the
proposition while six did not. 2 9 However , no stark trends across the
decade are apparent: victories were won in 1960, 1964, 1968, and 1969
but one proposition went down to defeat in 1961 and 1966 and four in
1968.
The black precincts took a decidedly more positive view, however,
toward the end of the decade. They supported only four of the ten
propositions and all four of them were voted on in 1968. This change,
however, resulted more from the substantive content and potenti al impact of the propositions than from an emergent positive tendency on the
part of blacks per se. 30
We may also observe that the Durham Committee for Negro Affairs was successful in achieving a highly cohesive vote in the black
precincts. Cohesion ranged from a low of the 68.6% vote against the
1969 1% local option sales tax to a high of the 87.5% vote against the
28

To illustrate this process I will use data from the 1969 sales tax referen dum.

Table 6
Number
County-Wide
6 Black Precincts
32 White Precincts

8651
486
8165

+

Total
Percent

Number

Percent

60.3
31.4
63.7

5706
1063
4643

39.7
68.6
36.3

14357
1549
12808

According to the assumptions outlined in the text, 12% or 1537 of the 12,808
votes cast in the 32 white precincts were cast by blacks. Computing 31.4% of 1537
yields 483 black positive votes and 68.6% of 1537 yields 1054 black negative votes.
Subtracting 483 from 8165 gives 7682 white positive votes and 1054 from 4643
leaves 3589 white negative votes or 11,271 white votes all together, of which 7682
is 68.2% and 3589 is 31.8%.
2 9 Only a simple majority is needed for approval.
3 0 See Keech, ch. IV and Winfield H. Rose, Referendum Voting and the Politics
of Health Care in Durham County, North Carolina, unpublished Doctoral dissertation, Duke University, 1973. In general , the question can be reduced to whethe r the
proposition had racial overtones or implications. If it did, the blacks saw themselves
as probable losers and, therefore, voted against it.
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1966 hospital bonds and averaged 99.1% on the whole. At the same
time, they were slightly more cohesive in opposition than in support:
the average of their six negative votes being 80.2% with that of their
four positive votes 77.5%.
In testing the effectiveness of the cohesive black bloc in terms of a
possible balance of power two perspectives can be brought to bear on
Table 6. The first centers on whether or not the blacks actually changed
the outcome and the second on whether or not they could have changed
the outcome if they had voted opposite to the way they did and at the
same rate of cohesion.
With respect to the 1960 school bonds and 1961 metropolitan charter
referenda it is clear that the black bloc did not and could not have
changed the final outcome because the white vote simply was too
strong. Increased turnout and cohesion would have been of no avail.
However, in the 1964 school bonds referendum the blacks almost defeated the proposition, their high negative vote bringing the total positive vote down to 51.5%. If they had voted oppositely they would simply
have reinforced the white vote but if they had been more cohesive or if
more blacks who voted in the primary had voted in the referendum at
the same rate of cohesion they undoubtedly could have defeated the
proposition by a narrow margin.
In the 1966 hospital referendum blacks brought the 45.l % white
positive vote down to 37.0%. Hence, they did not reverse the actual
white vote but since the white vote was fairly evenly divided they could
have changed the final outcome by voting positively as cohesively as
they, in fact, voted negatively. If they had done so they would have
overridden the white vote and made the total vote 55.5% in favor and
44.5% opposed. Increased voting and cohesion would have increased
black strength but would not have changed either the actual or hypothetical final result that did or would have occurred, given their existent
turnout and cohesion. In other words, existent turnout and cohesion
were sufficient to achieve either result, depending on the direction of the
vote. The same is true with regard to the 1968 hospital referendum in
which blacks again voted in the same direction, in sum, as whites but
much more strongly. They raised the white positive vote from 57.1%
to a county-wide total of 64.4%. Again, if they bad voted negatively at
the rate of 87.3% instead of positively they could have overridden the
white favorable vote and defeated the proposition. In that case the
total vote would have been 46.4% in favor and 53.6% against.
In the case of the 1968 school bonds referendum the strong negative vote of the blacks easily overcame the feeble white majority and
defeated the proposition. If ~e blacks had voted oppositely they
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simply would have reinforced the white favorable vote and increa sed
turnout and cohesion obviously would not have affected the final outcome in either case.
In the two 1968 library referenda the blacks supported the propo sitions but not well enough to overcome the strong white negative vote.
If they had voted in the opposite direction they again would have
reinforced the white vote. Howev er, in these instances the blacks again
possessed a potential balance of power. Hypothetically speaking, if
they had turned out to vote at the rate of 40% instead of 12.2% and if
they had vnted for both propositions at the rate of 80% instead of 74.1%
and 68.7% respectively, both of which are reasonable possibilities, they
would have boosted the total county-wide vote to a slight majority in
favor of the bonds and to 49.5% in favor of the permissive levy.
Compared with the library referenda, in the airport referendum of
1968 the white favorable vote was higher and the blacks were more
cohesive. Consequently, the blacks more nearly approached success in
that they raised the white positive vote of 37.1% to an overall 47.1%. In
this case, however , effective turnout ( 41.2%) and cohesion (79.8%)
exceeded or virtually equalled the levels hypothesized above but, given
their actual rate of turnout , if the blacks had supported the airport bonds
as cohesively as they did , in fact , support the hospital bonds , they would
have raised the county-wide vote to 48.9% in favor. Thus , realistical ly
speaking, in this instance blacks almost but did not quite possess a
balance of power.
The blacks opposed the 1969 sales tax and brought the white favoraible vote of 68.1% down to 60.3%. If their turnout rate had been ,i0%
instead of 15.9% and if they had voted against the proposition at the
rate of 80% instead of 68.6% they would have lowered the final positive
vote to 53.5%. Realistically speaking, in this instance , then, the blacks
did not possess a balance of pow er. Finally , if the blacks had voted
oppositely they would have reinforced the white vote rather than
changed it.
In sum, the blacks defeated one proposition ( 1968 school bonds)
and could have changed the outcome of two others ( 1966 and 1968
hospital bonds) by v,oting oppositely at the same rate of cohesion . In
these instances, then , they did in fact possess a balance of power and
they exercised it. In three other instances ( 1964 school bonds and 1968
library bonds and levy) there was a realistic hypothetical possibility of
their possessing a balance of power but they did not exercise it. Finally,
in four referenda ( 1960 school bonds, 1961 metro charter, 1968 airp ort
bonds , and 1969 sales tax) they did not possess and there was no realistic hypothetical possibility of their possess,ing a balanoe of power.
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In conclusion, let us examine Table 6 for achieved preference by
comparing columns two and four with column one. We may observe
that the blacks saw their preference achieved in four of the ten referenda. They thwarted the white majority once ( 1968 school bonds)
and majorities of both whites and blacks agreed three times ( 1961
metro charter, 1966 and 1968 hospital bonds). Finally , the majority
thwarted the black in the remaining six referenda.
In partisan elections the blacks have been more successful in
achieving their desired result, as Table 7 shows. Of 16 such elections
we may observe that their preference was the county-wide preference
on 15 occasions, the lone exception being the 1962 Senatorial contest. 31
Whites, on the other band, were similarly successful only eight times.
We already have observed that turnout was higher in general elections than in referenda. Table 7 shows that, in addition, the cohesion
of the black vote in partisan elections is considerably higher than in
referenda, the average of the former being 89.2% as opposed to 79.1%
among the latter. Moreover, in 15 of the 16 elections the blacks supported the Democratic candidate , their Democratic vote averaging
87.9%.
The white majority, on the other hand, supported the Democrait in
the four Senatorial races and in the first four House races (but in 1966
only by a small fraction). They supported the Republican in the House
races of 1968 and 1970 and not once did they support the Democratic
candidate for President or Governor. It is apparent, then, that the white
majority supported the Democrat only when he was a traditional, Southern Democrat of the "old school." Otherwise, they supported the Republicans or in the case of the 1968 Presidential election, George Wallace by a plurality. In this instance, the combined Nixon-Wallace vote
among whites totalled 82.9%.
Assessing the impact of the cohesive black bloc in terms of a
balance of power can be done more straightforwardly in the case of
partisan elections than in referenda. From Table 7 it is clear that in all
Presidential and Gubernatorial elections as well as in the 1968 and 1970
U. S. House races the black bloc provided the Democratic candidate's
winning margin in the county and in so doing possessed and exercised
an effective balance of power. Moreover, in the 1966 House contest the
white vote was so evenly divided that it again is clear that the blacks
possessed a balance of power. In addition, the same is true of the 1964
House race when the white vote was only 56.6% for Kornegay, the black
vote was 96.4% for Kornegay , and black turnout was 80.4%. The only
31 Senator Sam Ervin never enjoyed great popularity among Durham County
blacks due to his stand on civil rights issues.
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TABLE 7. Effect of Black Vote on Partisan Elections
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instance in which blacks clearly did not possess a balance of power was
in the 1962 Senatorial election.

It remains for us to examine the three remaining Senate races and
the two remaining House races. In each of these five cases black tum -
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out and cohesion equalled or exceeded the levels hypothesized in the
referenda analyses presented earlier. Consequently, we now will examine only the results that would have occurred if the blacks had voted
exactly opposite to what they did but at their given rates of cohesion
and turnout. Table 8 reveals that in only two of these five elections did
the black electorate possess a balance of power. In sum, in 12 of the
16 or 75% of the partisan elections under examination the cohesive black
bloc possessed and exercised a balance of power in that without their
vote the candidate preferred by the blacks would not have carried the
county.
We may also observe from Tables 7 and 8 that the lowest white
Democratic vote when the blacks were not a balance of power was
65.2% ( 1960 U. S. House) and that the highest white Democratic vote
when the blacks were a balance of power was 60.1% (1966 U.S. Senate).
Thus, with some variation due to cohesion and turnout, we can say that
the point at which cohesion of the white vote renders a black balance
of power impossible lies between these parameters. Table 6 reveals the
comparable interval in referendum voting, 62.9% ( 1968 airport bonds)
to 57.1% ( 1968 hospital bonds). That the boundaries of the latter interval are lower than those of the former is, of course, due to the alreadyobserved lower black turnout and cohesion in referenda. In other
TABLE 8.

Selected Elections with Black Vote Reversed

Actual
Countywide
Democratic Vote
1960
1966
1968
1960
1962

U.
U.
U.
U.
U.

S.
S.
S.
S.
S.

Senate
Senate
Senate
House
House

71.6%
69.5%
64.4%
70.3%
74.4%

Democratic Vote
if Black Vote
Hai/Be en Reversed
51.6%
45.8%
47.5%
51.4%
52.7%

words, lower black turnout and cohesion in referenda permit the white
electorate to be slightly less cohesive and still hold sway. On the other
hand, the blacks were able to exercise an effective balance of power
more often in partisan elections than in referenda because their cohesion
and turnout were higher and because the white vote was more evenly
divided.
The final question that this study will examine is the effectiveness
of the black bloc in electing black candidates for positions on the
County Board of Commissioners and for mayor of the city of Durham.
~ alluded to earlier, in 1968 two blacks were on the Commissioners'
ballot. They were Asa T. Spaulding, retired president of the North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Company, and J. C. Scarborough. Both,
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of course, were endorsed by the Durham Committee for Negro Affairs
and The Carolina Times. The black precincts voted 82.9% for Spaulding and gave him 32.1% of his total vote. At the same time, they voted
86.9% for Scarborough and gave him 40.5% of his total vote. Nevertheless, Spaulding was elected and actually led the ticket whereas Scarborough came in sixth and consequently lost. The highest perce nt age
of total vote that the black precincts gave any other candidate was
15.3%; thus, a considerable amount of "single-shot" 82 voting for the
black candidates occurred. Single-shot voting, however, obviously is not
enough to elect blacks. Even though he received fewer black votes th an
Scarborough, Spaulding led the ticket and won because he obviously was
able to attract more votes from the white electorate than Scarbor ough .
In 1970 Spaulding was the only black to make the race. The bl ack
precincts supported him at the rate of 83.9%, gave him 23.5% of his
total vote, and he came in second. Being an incumbent Democrat whose
victory was virtually certain, single-shot voting was not as necessa ry as
it had been in 1968 and the blacks supported the other four Dem ocrats,
all of whom won, at rates almost as high as that for Spaulding.
In 1971 Spaulding decided to run for mayor of Durham, the incum bent white mayor, R. W. Grabarek, having announced his decisi on
not to seek re-election. He was opposed in the primary by two whi tes.
The results of that primary are given in Table 9.38 The table shows that
Hawkins' support was virtually entirely white whereas Spaulding continued to attract biracial vote.
TABLE 9.

1971 Municipal Primary Election

Direction of
Black Vote

Spaulding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92.1%
Jacobs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4%
Hawkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7$

Percent of
Total Vote
Contributed
by Black
Precincts

38.9%
9.6$
2.0%

Division of
Total Vote

48.7%
3.0%
48.3%

Since no candidate received a majority, Spaulding and Hawkin s
faced each other in the general election two weeks later in which Hawkins defeated Spaulding 54.9% to 45.1%. The distinction of being the
6rst black elected mayor of a major southern city was thus left to Maynard Jackson in Atlanta.
See Keech, p. 32.
Five of the six black precincts lies within the city limits of Durham, No. 34
being the exception. This analysis is, therefore, based on the behavior of these five
precincts.
82
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In this election the black precincts supported Spaulding at the rate
of 93.6% and gave him 39.3% of his total vote. Comparable rates for
Hawkins were 5.2% and 1.8% respectively and it is plausible that these
votes ( 154 all together) were cast by the handful of whites who lived
in the black precincts. We see again, then, that Spaulding's support was
biracial whereas Hawkins' was not.
In one sense it was, of course, the power of sheer numbers that
defeated Spaulding. We already have observed that in the primary
white turnout was 21.2% while the black was 23.7% and that in the
general election white turnout was 40.8% while the black was 41.3%.
Thus, black turnout increased by 17.6 percentage points whereas white
rose by 19.6%. Moreover, 40.8% of the white electorate obviously is a
larger absolute number than 41.3% of the black, as Hawkins' final vote
amply demonstrates: his vote rose by 114.5% while Spaulding's rose by
only 75.2%. Thus, it would seem that a number of whites were willing
to support a black as one of five members of the Board of County Commissioners but were not willing to accept him as the city's elected executive. Nevertheless, approximately 60% of Spaulding's final vote came
from white precincts, a faot that speaks well for both him and for the
city's white voters.
In another sense it was, however, the failure of the blacks to exercise a balance of power that defeated Spaulding because they, in fact,
possessed such a potential. The obvious point that blacks must tum
out to vote at rates higher than whites in order to maximize their electoral potential already has been made and Spaulding's defeat in 1971 ~
an example of what results when they fail to do so. Hypothetically
speaking, if the behavior of the white electorate had remained unchanged and if black cohesion had remaiined 93.6% for Spaulding, a
black turnout rate of 66.9% would have made Spaulding the victor.
In sum, we already have observed that the presence of black candidates on the ballot does not induce blacks to tum out to vote at rates
appreciably higher than whites. Moreover, the experience of the elections just analyzed shows that: ( 1) Blacks who do turn out and vote
support the black candidate at high rates of cohesion and contribute an
indispensable portion of his total vote. ( 2) A black candidate cannot
win without a considerable amount of white support. In 1968 Spaulding was able to gamer such support: but Scarborough was not. ( 3) It is
easier for one black rather than two to be elected to a five-member
board of county commissioners. 84 ( 4) Even though Spaulding received
34
In 1968 when Spaulding and Scarborough were two of the five Democratic
nominees a Republican was elected. In 1970, however, when there was only one
black Democratic nominee, the Republican was defeated for re-election by a white
newcomer.
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white support in every instance, the total white electorate seems willing
to accept one black among five county commissioners and two among
13 city councilmen but, at the same time, is not willing to accep t a
black as the city's single executive officer. And finally, (5) be that as
it may, the blacks possibly could capitalize on white voter apathy and
elect such an official if they were not as apathetic themselves.
SUMMARY AND CO CLUSIO S
After laying the theoretical groundwork and sketching the political
culture of the area, this study has examined the electoral behavio r of
Durham County, North Carilina in the 1960's with emphasis on assessing the role of the black electorate in terms of a balance of power. At
this point there is no need to recapitulate all of the findings made.
Rather, it is sufficient simply to observe that a black balance of powe r is
indeed a fact and not a fancy, in spite of the fact that blacks do not
register and turn out to vote at rates comparable to those of whi tes,
when and/or because blacks vote at high rates of cohesion whereas the
white electorate divides itself more evenly. For the former the Durham
Committee for Negro Affairs undoubtedly is responsible; for the latter
it, no doubt, is thankful. Yet, the black balance of power that exists
occurs more often in state and national elections, when Durham County
obviously is not the total electorate, and less often in local electi ons
and referenda. Thus, its policy impact is limited on both fronts. 86
The fact remains, however, that in elections such as local referenda
the blacks are a force to be reckoned with. While they could strength en
their position through increased regisb·ation and turnout, they did possess or could have possessed a balance of power in six of the ten such
elections examined in this study. The process by which white political
leaders have come to terms with this has been slow and painful but
they have come to terms with it. The DC A has thus become able to
bargain with the "establishment" because the establishment knows that
while black support does not ensure victory, black opposition rende rs
defeat much more likely. Moreover, black leaders have the advan tage
over the white in that the black vote is more cohesive, manageable, and
deliverable whereas the white vote is fragmented, uncertain, and undeliverable. Not knowing how much support they will actually receive
from the white electorate, white leaders must accommodate the black
perspective if they want the proposition they are putting forward to
have a realistic chance of countywide approval. 86
See Keech, Ch. IV, for an elaboration of this point.
These conclusions are developed more fully in my dissertation, cited in footnote 30 above, and by Jeanne Fox in Regionalism and Minority Participation, Washington, D. C.: Joint Center for Political Studies, 1973, Chapter 2.
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